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ADAMS V. ASKEW: THE RIGHT TO VOTE AND THE
RIGHT TO BE A CANDIDATE-ANALOGOUS OR
INCONGRUOUS RIGHTS?
Expansion of political participation and the candidate's freedom
of access to the ballot have gained increasing attention in recent
years.' Controversy over the right to such access has arisen amidst the
efforts of many states to limit the size of the ballot.2 A conflict which
has developed between those who would allow unfettered access to
the ballot and those who would limit entry to the political arena3 has
coalesced into two divergent approaches to the fulfillment of a single
goal. The goal is the democratic system of government, and each
approach claims to represent the only mode for a viable democratic
process.
Until the Supreme Court intervened in the Tennessee apportion-
ment scheme in Baker v. Carr,' the federal courts had characterized
challenges to state electoral regulations as "political questions" un-
suited to judicial scrutiny.5 Since the Baker ruling, federal courts
Political participation involves the right to vote and the right to form political
parties as well as the right to be a candidate for public office. The right to vote was
declared a fundamental right in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966). The right to form and be a part of political parties is protected under the right
of association. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). However, the right of candi-
dacy has received little discussion until recently. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23 (1968). For a discussion of the status of all three forms of political participa-
tion, see LeClercq, The Emerging Federally Secured Right of Political Participation,
8 IND. L. REV. 607 (1975) [hereinafter cited as LeClercq].
2 The states have a legitimate interest in regulating the ballot. In a recent deci-
sion, the Supreme Court stated that almost all of the various state regulations are
constitutionally valid. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974); accord, Lubin v.
Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Adams v. Askew, 511 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1975); Beller v.
Kirk, 328 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Fla, 1970), af'd, 403 U.S. 925 (1971); Hadnot v. Amos,
320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970), af'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
There is a wide variance among the states in methods of which a candidate's
access to the ballot is controlled. Typical of one extreme is Ohio, which requires
payment of a qualifying fee equal to /2% of the annual salary of the office as prerequis-
ite to being placed in either the primary or general election ballot. OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 3513.10 (1972). Virginia requires the payment of a fee in order to be placed on
the primary ballot and the filing of a petition by non-affiliated candidates to obtain a
place on either the primary or general election ballot, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.1-168, -
185, -198 (1973 Repl. Vol). In contrast to such burdensome restrictions, Tennessee does
not require a filing fee, but demands a petition for both the primary and general
elections. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-505 (Supp. 1974).
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
See LeClercq, supra note 1, at 618-19, for a discussion of the role of Baker in
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have become involved in the political system in order to reconcile
state attempts to regulate access to the ballot with the individual's
desire to participate in the political process.' In one such instance,
the Supreme Court noted the tension between the two approaches:
The present case draws these two means of achieving an effec-
tive, representative political system into apparent conflict and
presents the question of how to accommodate the desire for
increased ballot access with the imperative of protecting the
integrity of the electoral system from the recognized dangers
of ballots listing so many candidates as to undermine the pro-
cess of giving expression to the will of the majority.
7
States attempt to control the size of the ballot in order to avoid
irrational voting or electoral fragmentation which may result in run-
off elections. Long lists of candidates tend to confuse and frustrate
the voter.' Moreover, mechanical problems increase as the number of
candidates overwhelms voting machines.' These factors combine to
threaten a severe dysfunction of the electoral system. In response, the
states have developed methods for regulating the candidate's access
to the ballot.'0
the protection of individual political rights from violations imposed by state electoral
systems. Baker was significant because it represented the first real intervention by the
Supreme Court in a state's system of regulating its ballot. Prior to Baker, the states
were thought to have plenary power to set qualifications for political participation,
subject only to a federally protected right against racial discrimination. See, e.g.,
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944), for the pre-Baker approach.
6 See R. CLAUDE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS (1970), for a
discussion of the role of the Supreme Court in protecting the rights of political partici-
pation from state regulation.
7 Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 714 (1974).
1 In Lubin, the Court reasoned that the addition of insincere candidates to the
ballot merely increases the number of candidates and the consequent confusion of the
electorate. Id. at 715.
The state could be faced with a perplexing problem-what to do when there are
more candidates than there are handles on a voting machine. Even if the number of
candidates does not eclipse the capacity of the voting machine, a magnitude of aspir-
ants can create difficulties such as the bewilderment of a voter confronted with a choice
from a covey of candidates, few of whom are known. Many voters avoid voting in
overcrowded elections, and those who do participate are often confused and frustrated.
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715 (1974).
o In Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), the court overturned the Ohio system
for limiting the size of the ballot because the system made it practically impossible
for a "third party" to gain access to the ballot; the Court, however, recognized that
the state has an interest in political stability. Even though the Ohio restrictions were
invalidated, recent decisions have demonstrated that the states can still require a
THE RIGHT TO APPEAR ON BALLOT
Various states have attempted to regulate the ballot through a fee
system which requires a candidate to pay a predetermined sum as a
condition precedent to being placed on the official ballot." The filing
fee is designed to limit the ballot to serious candidates who are
thought to demonstrate their earnest intentions through payment of
the fee. 2 The constitutionality of one such fee system was challenged
in the recent case of Adams v. Askew.1 3 Adams crystallized the strug-
gle between individuals who propound the necessity of unrestricted
candidacy and the governmental bodies which argue for the indispen-
sability of a limited ballot.
The plaintiffs in Adams expounded the view that ballot access
should be essentially unrestricted. Although they had been able to
pay the fee and had been placed on the ballot, they alleged that the
required filing fees inhibited their constitutionally guaranteed access
to the ballot." In earlier decisions, the Supreme Court had declared
unconstitutional the requirement of filing fees, but expressly had
limited its holding to the indigent candidate.'5 However, those cases
constituted the initial review of filing fees by the Supreme Court, and
the Court's willingness to invalidate application of the filing fees to
indigents seemed to foreshadow the potential vulnerability of the
entire system."8 The plaintiffs in Adams v. Askew predicated their
showing of threshold support from the potential candidate or party before giving them
a place on the ballot. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); American Party v. White,
415 U.S. 767 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971). See LeClercq, supra note
1, at 627. Compare Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) with Rosario v. Rockefeller,
410 U.S. 752 (1973) (restrictions on change in party affiliation). See generally Kester,
Constitutional Restrictions on Political Parties, 60 VA. L. REV. 735 (1975).
,, See Comment, The Constitutionality of Qualifying Fees for Political
Candidates, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 109 (1971), for a chart of the use through 1971 of
qualifying fees by the states.
,2 Adams v. Askew, 511 F.2d 700, 704 (1975). The rationale of the qualifying fee
system is that only a serious candidate will be willing to pay the requisite fee. The
presumption that payment of the fee indicates that a candidate is serious raises ques-
tions concerning irrebutalbe presumptions. If payment raises a presumption of serious-
ness, non-payment raises a presumption of frivolity. Therefore, if an indigent candi-
date has no other available means of indicating his sincerity, he has no way to rebut
the presumption that he does not want to run and thus will be excluded from the
ballot. LeClercq, supra note 1, at 635. Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 95 S. Ct. 2457 (1975).
13 511 F.2d 700 (1975).
" Id. at 703. Florida could not require the payment of a fee from indigents. Fair
v. Taylor, 359 F. Supp. 304 (M.D. Fla., 1973), vacated and remanded, 416 U.S. 918
(1974).
'1 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), and Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974),
involved indigent candidates who could not pay the filing fee.
" Because the filing fee system had been struck down in part, the question arose
1976]
246 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII
challenge to the constitutionality of the qualifying fee requirements
on those decisions.1
7
The Supreme Court first reviewed filing fees in Bullock v. Carter.8
The plaintiffs in Bullock were indigents who challenged the Texas
filing fee system which imposed high fees on candidates for state
office. 9 The size of the required fees led the Court to conclude that
the system effectively excluded indigents from candidacy." The
Court noted that such an exclusion greatly affected voters by depriv-
ing them of the opportunity to vote for indigent candidates.' Since
the right to vote, which previously had been declared a fundamental
right,2  was involved, the Supreme Court subjected the Texas fee
system to a strict standard of review.21 To withstand such review, the
as to whether the Supreme Court was contemplating the invalidation of all qualifying
fees. The Court seemingly was expanding the protection which" could be afforded to
political candidates. LeClercq, supra note 1, at 625-36. But see Jardine, Ballot Access
Rights: The Constitutional Status of the Right to Run for Office, 1974 UTAH L. REV.
290 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Jardine], for a view that the Burger Court may be
retreating from the broad protection given by the Warren Court to electoral-connected
rights, especially the right to vote.
'7 511 F.2d at 702.
405 U.S. 134 (1975). Lendall v. Bryant, 387 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Ark. 1975)
recently interpreted Bullock and Lubin. In that case, a third party had to file a petition
in order to be placed on the ballot. The court emphasized the excessive length of time
between the deadline for filing the petition and the election and declared the statute
unconstitutional. The court observed that a common rule runs through Bullock and
Lubin as well as two companion cases to Lubin: Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974),
and American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974). In respect to that rule, the district
court stated:
[T]he measures adopted by the State must not go beyond what the
State's compelling interests actually require, and broad and stringent
requirements or restrictions with respect to would-be independent
candidates cannot stand where more moderate ones would do as well.
387 F. Supp. at 402. For comments on the impact of Bullock and Lubin, see Note, The
Constitutionality of Candidate Filing Fees, 70 MICH. L. REv. 558 (1972); Comment,
Constitutional Law-The Validity of Primary Filing Fees, 18 N.Y.L.F. 451 (1972);
Comment, Constitutional Law-A State May Not Require Filing Fee From Indigent
as Prerequisite to Ballot Placement, 50 WASH. L. REv. 209 (1974); Comment, The
Emerging Right to Candidacy in State and Local Elections: Constitutional Protection
of the Voter, the Candidate, and the Political Group, 17 WAYNE L. REv. 1543 (1971).
" Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
Id. at 143.
Id. at 144.
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
Id. at 144. Mr. Chief Justice Burger has indicated his dissatisfaction with the
inflexibility of the strict scrutiny test. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 W.S. 330 (1972) (Burger,
C. J., dissenting). In Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), his majority opinion
deviated slightly from the traditional strict scrutiny standard of review. The Bullock
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fees had to be reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of a com-
pelling state interest. 14 The Court determined that less restrictive
means for limiting the size of the ballot existed and accordingly held
that states which require the payment of a filing fee must afford
indigents an alternative means of access to the ballot, such as the
collection of names on a petition.25
The Court next reviewed qualifying fees in Lubin v. Panish,21 in
which the plaintiffs again were indigents.27 While the Court did not
identify its standard of review, the Lubin decision, employing the
same language used in Bullock, stated that the fees had to be reason-
ably necessary to the accomplishment of a compelling state interest.
Hence, the Supreme Court ruled that California could not compel
indigents to pay a qualifying fee in order to be placed on the ballot.2
In Adams u. Askew," three persons initiated the action as repre-
sentatives of the class of candidates who had paid the Florida qualify-
ing fee in 1972. Although those individuals were not indigents, 0 they
argued that filing fees were an unconstitutional barrier to the ballot
regardless of whether the candidate could not pay or was merely
test required that the challenged regulations be reasonably necessary to the accom-
plishment of a compelling state interest. That formula was also applied in Lubin v.
Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974), Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974), and American Party
v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974). See generally LeClercq, supra note 1, at 635.
The application of the Bullock standard involves the question whether there are
less restrictive alternatives to the regulation. If such alternatives exist, the requirement
is not necessary and will be struck down. 405 U.S. at 145. See generally Gunther, The
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Gunther] for a discussion of the Burger Court's approach to review of equal
protection claims.
2 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972).
2 Id. See, e.g., Matthews v. Little, 498 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1974). In Matthews,
there were alternative methods to qualify for the ballot. With such alternatives avail-
able, the system was found to be constitutional. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709,
722 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Blackmun noted that the majority had
disregarded the write-in process as a viable alternative. He argued that write-in voting
was a constitutionally acceptable alternative.
11 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
u Id. The effect of the filing fees on the indigent candidates and voters impressed
Mr. Justice Douglas. In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that Lubin
dealt less with candidate and voter rights than with wealth discrimination. Focusing
on the interests of the indigents, he concluded that the filing fee was unconstitutional
in that it discriminated against poor people because wealth became a qualification for
political participation. 415 U.S. at 719. (Douglas, J., concurring).
' Id. at 718-719.
511 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 702.
1976]
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unwilling to do so. 3' Plaintiffs contended that the right of candidacy
is inseparable from the right to vote and, therefore, warrants consti-
tutional protection regardless of the candidate's economic status.
32
Thus, plaintiffs sought to have the fee system declared unconstitu-
tional with respect to non-indigents as well as indigents.33
The Fifth Circuit, however, stressed the necessity of limiting the
ballot and noted the role that such regulation played in ensuring that
the choice by voters would be more easily and reasonably made . 3 The
court focused on the risks to the political system brought on by frivo-
lous candidacies.3 5 In the court's analysis, at the core of the state's
interest in regulating the ballot was the desire for an efficiently oper-
ating political system.36 Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that qualifying
fees were a rational means by which the state could regulate the
ballot.
37
3' Id. The Fifth Circuit heavily emphasized the fact that the Supreme Court in
Bullock had noted that plaintiffs were unable and not merely unwilling to pay the fees.
A different interpretation of that language is found in Stoner v. Fortson, 359 F. Supp.
579 (N.D. Ga. 1972). In Stoner, the plaintiff stated that he was unwilling to pay the
fee because he had little money available for use in his campaign. He could have raised
the money among his friends but did not wish to do so. The district court held that
the language in Bullock was not determinative. Id. at 581 n.4.
32 Id. See also Toporek v. State Election Commission, 362 F. Supp. 613 (D.S.C.
1973).
511 F.2d at 702.
The Florida state courts historically have placed great emphasis on the state
interest. Qualifying fees withstood a challenge based on the state constitution in Bod-
ner v. Gray, 129 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1961). Prior to the Fair decision, supra note 14, federal
courts had also refused to overturn the system. Spillers v. Slaughter, 325 F. Supp. 550
(M.D. Fla. 1971), vacated and remanded with instructions, 404 U.S. 806 (1971); Fowler
v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 592 (M.D. Fla. 1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 986, order
granting injunction, 400 U.S. 1205 (1970) (even though candidate lost suit, he was
placed on ballot). Wetherington v. Adams, 309 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd
and remanded, 406 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1968). Compare Draper v. Phelps, 351 F. Supp.
677 (W.D. Okla. 1972), which upheld a candidate residency requirement because of
the compelling state interest in regulating the ballot, with Bolanowski v. Raich, 330
F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1971), which overturned such a requirement.
511 F.2d at 702.
Id. at 704. One commentator has noted that the state interest in regulating the
ballot covers four broad categories: (1) maintaining the integrity of the ballot; (2)
preventing confusion; (3) ensuring competent candidates; (4) expediting administra-
tive concerns. Jardine, supra note 16, at 303-06.
11 511 F.2d at 704. But see Harper v. Vance, 342 F. Supp. 136, 143 (N.D. Ala. 1972)
where the court decided that qualifying fees did not have a rational basis; hence that
court did not have to decide whether to apply strict scrutiny.
In determining that the Florida filing fees were a rational means for regulating the
ballot, the Fifth Circuit relied on Bullock as support for its conclusion that there might
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The plaintiffs-in Adams argued that Bullock and Lubin required
more than a rational relationship between the fees and the state
objective." They contended that the strict scrutiny test, which would
require that the fees be necessary to the accomplishment of a compel-
ling state interest,39 should be utilized in cases involving restrictions
on the right to be a candidate. In rejecting that contention, the Fifth
Circuit distinguished between the rights involved in Bullock and
Lubin and the rights brought before the court in Adams. 0
Strict scrutiny had been utilized in Bullock because the right to
vote, a right considered fundamental by the courts,4 was involved in
be a rational basis for the requirement of the fee. 511 F.2d at 702 citing Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 146 (1974). However, in Bullock, the Court was recognizing the
inchoate nature of the issue and was deferring a decision as to the rationality of filing
fees. Moreover, the Court in Lubin was highly critical of the rational basis of requiring
fees. 415 U.S. at 171. Lubin emphasized the inadequacy of filing fees to demonstrate
a potential candidate's sincerity. Id. Qualifying fees are not a conclusive test of sincer-
ity. Additionally, they measure a candidate's qualifications in economic terms, a con-
stitutionally fatal shortcoming. Id. at 716. Consequently, there is sufficient indication
in Lubin to warrant consideration of the rationality of filing fees.
Of all the reasons given by the states to justify regulation of the ballot, the Su-
preme Court seems to have been most impressed by the need to exclude frivolous
candidates from the ballot. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709' 717 (1974); Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971). However,
the payment of a qualifying fee is not a certain test of a candidate's fr volity. Qualifying
fees can exclude sincere candidates as well as allow insincere candidates who can afford
the price of access to the ballot. For example, a businessman may be willing to pay
the cost of candidacy in order to improve his business by making his name known, or
an attorney may wish to circumvent the ethical prohibitions on advertising. See Lubin
v. Panish, supra at 717.
1' 511 F.2d at 702. The plaintiffs advanced another argument which the Fifth
Circuit succinctly rejected. Plaintiffs contended that the decision of Fair v. Taylor, 359
F. Supp. 304 (M.D. Fla. 1973), vacated and remanded, 416 U.S. 918 (1974), which
struck down the requirement of the fees from indigents, made the fees void as applied
to non-indigents as well. The Fifth Circuit interpreted plaintiff's argument to be that
the court in Fair should have declared the fees void in toto. Even though the plaintiffs
in Fair had standing to challenge the fees on their face, that court refused to extent
its ruling beyond the rights of indigents. 359 F. Supp. at 307. The Fifth Circuit denied
that the Fair ruling was too narrow and further noted that judicial policy supported a
narrow ruling which applied only to the facts brought before the court. 511 F.2d at 705.
See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,
256 (1953). See also Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) for the traditional discussion of the limitation of judicial statesmanship.
31 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
511 F.2d at 701.
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). But see Salyer Land
Co. v. Tulane Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973), where the Court
did not utilize strict scrutiny in a case involving voting rights. The Court upheld a
1976]
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the case. The decision in Bullock was based on the effect of the
exclusion of indigent candidates upon voters.2 Not only were the
voters limited to their choice of candidates, but the effect was propor-
tionally greater on the less affluent members of the community. 3 The
Fifth Circuit noted that the use of strict scrutiny in Bullock was
compelled by the severe impairment of the rights of voters to partici-
pate effectively in the political system through the disqualification of
serious but indigent candidates.4 The issue in Adams, however, was
the right to run for office, which in the Fifth Circuit's view, was not
a fundamental right. 5 Thus, while Florida's qualifying fee may have
placed some incidental limitations on the exercise of the right to vote,
its effect was insufficient to compel strict review.46
In contrast, the Supreme Court in Bullock had concentrated upon
the impact of the qualifying fee system upon voters. Affluent voters
had the choice of affluent candidates because the candidate's eco-
nomic status allowed him to pay the fee. However, the indigent can-
system where the directors of the District were elected on the basis of a person having
a vote for each $100 in assessed property he owned. See also Richardson v. Ramirez,
418 U.S. 24 (1974) where the court upheld the disenfranchisement of felons. See Jar-
dine, supra note 16, at 293-95.
42 405 U.S. at 143-44. Because of the close relationship between the rights of
candidates and voters, voters will sometimes be made part of the candidate's suit.
Some cases have allowed voters to intervene. See, e.g., Carter v. Dies, 321 F. Supp.
1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Jenness v. Little, 306 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Ga. 1970), appeal
dismissed, 397 U.S. 94 (1970). Some voters have been joined as plaintiffs in the suit.
Duncantell v. City of Houston, 333 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
' 405 U.S. at 144.
511 F.2d at 703.
Id. at 702. The Supreme Court noted in Bullock that the right of candidacy had
not yet been afforded fundamental status and did not warrant strict scrutiny. 405 U.S.
at 142. However, one district court has treated the right of candidacy as fundamental:
[T]he right to run or be a candidate is inextricably woven into the
fabric of the First Amendment. Consequently, any abridgement of
that right must receive careful judicial scrutiny ....
Duncantell v. City of Houston, 333 F. Supp. 973, 975 (S.D. Tex. 1971). The reasoning
of Duncantell is evident in other cases which treat the right to candidacy as fundamen-
tal. Gonzales v. City of Sinton, 319 F. Supp. 189 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Thomas v. Mims,
317 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. Ala. 1970).
"' Id. at 703. But see Bolanowski v. Raich, 330 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
One lower court has described the rationale of Bullock as looking to the effects on the
exercise of the vote caused by the restrictions on candidacy. The court concluded that
the compelling interest standard is applicable to a statutory restriction on candidacy
if that restriction has had a discriminatory impact which, if it had resulted directly
from a statute limiting the right to vote, would have required application of the stricter
standard of review to that statute. Human Rights Party v. Secretary of State, 370 F.
Supp. 921, 923 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
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didate was excluded by the high fees, restricting the poor voter's
opportunity to choose a representative from his own economic class.
7
Assuming that a voter would tend to cast his vote for someone from
his own social and economic background, the indigent voter would be
frustrated by the limitation of his choice to a selection of affluent
candidates. On this basis, the Fifth Circuit in Adams held that the
connection between voters' rights and candidates' rights depended
upon the involvement of indigents in the controversy." The decision
in Adams turned on the distinction between the rights of candidates
and the rights of voters."8 Whether such a distinction is tenable, how-
ever, is a difficult question.
The Supreme Court recognized the difficulty in distinguishing
between the two rights by indicating that restrictions upon candi-
dates were to be examined in a manner which considers the extent
and nature of their impact oh voters 0 Moreover, while the Bullock
opinion stated that the right to vote and the right to be a candidate
are incapable of "neat separation,"'51 the Court stated in Lubin that
the two rights are inseparably intertwined. 5 The Lubin opinion did
not specify whether the qualifying fees were closely scrutinized be-
cause of their effect on voters or whether the Court was tacitly assign-
ing fundamental status to the right of candidacy. The Court's silence
indicates a third possibility, that the two rights are linked together
by a common source-free political expression.
Lubin indicated that a freely accessible ballot serves an important
function in effectuating optimum political participation. The Court
observed that the right of candidacy warrants protection and is inter-
twined with the rights of the electorate.53 The Supreme Court did not
differentiate between the right of affluent candidates and the right
of indigent candidates, nor did it qualify its reasoning to apply only
405 U.S. at 144.
511 F.2d at 703.
4 The most powerful argument in favor of making the distinction is that histori-
cally the right to be a candidate has not been afforded the same degree of protection
as the right to vote. However, this line of reasoning does not consider the fact that the
right to vote has been afforded protection as a fundamental right only within the last
ten years. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The true test of
whether the two rights can be distinguished in analysis of the origin and function of
each right. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Qualifying Fees for Political
Candidates, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 109, 127 (1971).
"0 405 U.S. at 143.
31 Id.
52 415 U.S. at 716.
S Id.
1976]
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to indigent candidates whose rights affect the rights of poor voters.
Rather, the thrust of the decision was that the ballot must be reason-
ably accessible to everyone. Consequently, the Supreme Court's rea-
soning may indicate that such distinctions made by the Adams court
are not tenable.
5 4
The Fifth Circuit's distinction in Adams between the right to vote
and the right to run for office seems highly contrived. An analysis of
the origin and functions of the right to vote blurs the distinction
between that right and the right of candidacy. The right to vote is
deemed essential to the concept of free political expression under the
First Amendment.5 The right of candidacy is also rooted in the idea
of political expression. Each is but a facet-of free expression, and each
is so closely related to the other that consideration of the effects of
ballot restrictions on one without consideration of the effects on the
other is virtually impossible. 6
The artificiality of the Fifth Circuit's distinction between the
right to vote and the right to run for office is illuminated by the
similarity between the two rights. The right to be a candidate is an
integral a part of the First Amendment as the right to vote.17 The two
rights are analogous" and interdependent. 9 Candidacy without vot-
ers would be worthless, and the right to vote would be meaningless
were there no parties nor candidates from which to choose. 0 Conse-
" Id. at 719.
The franchise is probably the most effective mode of political expression avail-
able to an individual. An elected official may ignore public criticism until he feels that
his ability to garner votes is being impaired. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Ajello v. Schaffer, 349 F.
Supp. 1168 (D. Conn. 1972); Socialist Workers Party v. Martin, 345 F. Supp. 1132
(S.D. Tex. 1972), afi'd, 483 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1973).
"' Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
51 Duncantell v. City of Houston, 333 F. Supp. 973, 975 (S.D. Tex. 1971); accord,
Socialist Worker's Party v. Martin, 345 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd, 483
F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1973).
Jenness v. Little, 306 F. Supp. 925, 927 (N.D. Ga. 1970), appeal dismissed, 397
U.S. 94 (1970). See also Ajello v. Schaffer, 349 F. Supp. 1168, 1175 (D. Conn. 1972);
Socialist Workers Party v. Martin, 345 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd, sub
nom. Socialist Workers Party v. Hill, 483 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1973). But cf. Beller v.
Kirk, 328 F. Supp. 483 (S.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd mem., 403 U.S. 925 (1971).
5' Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
Duncantell v. City of Houston, 333 F. Supp. 973, 976 (S.D. Tex. 1971). A district
court similarly noted the relationship between the right of political association and the
right to vote. The right to form a party means little if the party cannot present a
candidate to the voters. Likewise, the right to vote is burdened when active parties
are excluded from the ballot. Barnhardt v. Mandel, 311 F. Supp. 814, 824 (D. Md.
1970). See also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968).
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quently, the right to vote entails more than the ability to cast a vote
for a candidate; rather, the right to vote is the right to cast one's vote
in a meaningful way-to have a choice of a candidate who represents
the voter's views.6 '
Political expression is the means through which the people ensure
that the government is fairly representative of their needs and de-
sires. 2 Different segments of society can vote against those elected
officials who raise their distrust. Factions displeased with the status
quo may form political parties and present candidates.63 Thus, the
rights to vote, to form political parties, and to run for office are
integrated in the system of representative government. The integral
function of those three rights has led the Supreme Court to note that
each of the three is fundamental to the entire system of civil and
political rights.64 Such a conclusion is compelled, in the Court's rea-
soning, because the right to associate and the right to be a candidate
are intertwined with the right to vote." However, the question arises
whether that conclusion signifies that the right to be a candidate is
on equal footing with the right to vote.
Analysis of the origin and function of the right to run for public
office suggests that the right of candidacy may be analogous to the
right to vote.66 Both the origin and function of the right of candidacy
point to the rational congruity of that right and the franchise. The
right to be a candidate derives from two sources-the right to vote
and the right of political association." Furthermore, these rights form
1, Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1972); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144
(1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 383 U.S. 23, 32 (1968). However, Lubin indicates that
minor restrictions upon the ability of a voter to have a suitable candidate available
may not present constitutional questions. 415 U.S. at 716-717. The harm must be
significant before a federal court will intervent. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730
(1974).
62 Ensuring fair representation has been noted as the basis for free expression:
It appears to this court that the reasons given for requiring the com-
pelling interest standard in voting cases are equally applicable to
cases challenging qualifications for public office; in both situations the
challenge is directed to the assumption that the institutions of state
government are structured so as to fairly represent all the people.
Stapleton v. City Clerk, 311 F. Supp. 1187, 1190 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
0 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
" Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974) and cases cited therein. See
also Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969)..
91 Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1974). But cf. Rosario g. Rockefeller, 410 U.S.
752 (1973).
9' See, e.g., Duncantell v. City of Houston, 333 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Tex. 1973);
Socialist Workers Party v. Welch, 334 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
6, One commentator has described the relationship as follows;
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part of the concept that through free political expression, the political
system will remain representative of the will of the people. In these
ways, candidacy is a corollary 8 or a concomitant 8 of the right to vote.
While other courts have noted the congruity of the two rights, 70 the
Fifth Circuit in Adams refused to equate the right of candidacy with
the right to vote. However, the connection between the rights does not
depend on the economic status of the individuals who are involved.
Rather, the two rights are related through a factor which is common
to everyone-the right to free political expression. The right to vote,
to form parties, and to run for office share corresponding places in the
system of free expression and self-government and merge into a right
of political participation."
The Fifth Circuit in Adams rejected the merger of the rights and
instead distinguished between the rights of candidates and the rights
of voters. Moreover, such a distinction was dependent upon the eco-
nomic status of the candidate-the court reasoned that the rights of
candidates were analogous to the rights of voters only when the candi-
date was indigent.72 Because the right to vote-a fundamental
right-was not involved, the court ruled that a state can require a
non-indigent to pay a qualifying fee as a prerequisite to being placed
on the ballot. Such a requirement is, however, virtually an economic
qualification for candidacy-a qualification forbidden by the Consti-
tution. 3 An individual's right to be a candidate is not absolute, but
neither is the state's power to restrict access to the ballot. In its
analysis of the difference between the right to vote and the right to
be a candidate, the Adams court failed to consider the benefits of a
limited ballot in light of the need to ensure full political expression.
The right to be a candidate issues from two distinct but related
sources. It wells derivatively from the right to vote, since restrictions
on candidacy have an obvious impact upon the right to case a mean-
ingful vote for the candidates of one's choice. The right springs di-
rectly from the right of political association protected by the first and
fourteenth amendments.
LeClercq, supra note 1, at 625.
Ajello v. Schaffer, 349 F. Supp. 1168, 1175 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Thomas v. Mims,
317 F. Supp. 179, 181 (S.D. Ala. 1970); Jenness v. Little, 306 F. Supp. 925, 926-27 (N.D.
Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed, 397 U.S. 94 (1970).
11 Duncantell v. City of Houston, 333 F. Supp. 973, 975 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
71 See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
11 LeClercq, supra note 1, at 627.
72 Adams v. Askew, 511 F.2d 700, 702 (5th Cir. 1975).
73 Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974).
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